

Q. #1769

Document No. 5604

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MD/JAG/FS/JC/15(3A)

IN THE MATTER OF THE ILLTREATMENT OF BRITISH  
PRISONERS OF WAR IN JAVA AND SUMATRA BETWEEN  
1942 and 1945

[AFFIDAVIT]

I, Wing Commander PATRICK SLANEY DAVIS, No. 39862, Royal Air Force (Pilot) at present on the strength of No. 106 P.R.C., R.A.F. Station, Cosford, and on 42 days repatriation leave at my permanent home address "Lyndhurst", 20 Cliff Parade, Leigh-on-Sea, Essex, make oath and say as follows:-

The Report which is now produced and shown to me marked "PSD1" is a report compiled by me on the 19th November 1945 relating to Japanese War Crimes in Java and Sumatra between 8th March 1942 and 20th September 1945.

The facts set out in the Report are true and are within my own knowledge except where the contrary is stated.

SWORN by the said PATRICK SLANEY DAVIS )  
at 6 Spring Gardens in the City of )  
WESTMINSTER this nineteenth day of )  
November 1945 ) (Signed) PATRICK SLANEY DAVIS.

BEFORE ME:

G. BARRATT, Lieutenant-colonel,  
Legal Staff.

Military Department,  
Office of the Judge Advocate General,  
LONDON, S.W. 1.

I certify that this is a true copy of the original affidavit.

/s/ G. Barratt, Lt. Col.,  
Legal Staff,  
Office of the Judge Advocate  
General. ]

"P.S.D.1."

This is the Report marked "P.S.D.1" referred to in the Affidavit of Wing Commander Patrick Slaney Davis sworn this nineteenth day of November 1945 BEFORE ME

G. BARRATT, Lieutenant-colonel, Legal Staff.  
Military Dept., Office of the Judge Advocate General,  
London, S.W.1.

REPORT BY WING COMMANDER P.S. DAVIS, ROYAL AIR FORCE, RELATING TO THREE AND HALF YEARS PRISONER OF WAR CAPTIVITY UNDER THE JAPANESE IN J.A. AND SUMATRA. - MARCH 8th, 1942 to SEPTEMBER 20th, 1945.

I, Wing Commander Patrick Slaney DAVIS, No. 39862, Royal Air Force (Pilot) at present on the strength of No. 106 F.A.C., R.A.F. Station, Cosford, and on 42 days repatriation leave at my permanent home address - "Lyndhurst", 20 Cliff Parade, Leigh-on-Sea, Essex, report as follows:-

2. In January 1942, I was serving as the No. 2 Organisation Staff Officer to Air Headquarters Far East, Sims Road, Singapore, on the 2nd February, 1942, I was posted to the Near Headquarters Royal Air Force, Palembang, Sumatra. After two weeks, Palembang was attacked by Japanese Forces and I proceeded to Royal Air Force Headquarters, Java, located at Soekra Boemi, under the Command of Air Vice Marshal MALTBY. On 26th February, 1942, a new Allied Headquarters was opened at the Military Academy situated on the Dargoveg, Bandoeng, under the command of Air Chief Marshal, Sir Richard FIERCE. After four days, I returned to Soekra Boemi and on the 3rd March, 1942 I returned to Bandoeng, when Air Vice Marshal MALTBY took over as Allied Commander in Chief from General Wavell and Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Fierce. On 6th March, 1942, the Japanese attack on Java had progressed to the extent that the aerodrome at Kalijati had fallen to their occupation and a serious aerial attack was in progress against MDIK, the aerodrome south of the city of Bandoeng. Considerable confusion existed and it was decided to withdraw the present Headquarters to the Central Hotel, Tasik Malaja, where I proceeded on the 7th March, 1942, accompanied by Group Captain COGGLE. On the afternoon of March 8th, 1942, we were officially informed by the Dutch that a decision to capitulate to the Japanese Forces had been reached. Air Vice Marshal MALTBY decided to withdraw the British Forces located around Tasik Malaja and the Australian Forces located around Buitenzorg to the hills above Garoet and their dispose his forces to withstand the enemy. I was ordered by Air Commodore STATION to take command of the convoy of British troops from Tasik Malaja to Parmegaten, a tea estate situated in the hills above Garoet. On the afternoon of the 9th March, 1942, I reported to Air Commodore STATION the successful arrival of the whole convoy. The British force was disposed on the hills around PARMEGATEN, the Australian Force being dispersed on the next range of hills lying to the right of the British position. On approximately 10th March, 1942, we were informed by Air Vice Marshal MALTBY that the British Force had to surrender, together with the Dutch, under the terms of the capitulation by General ter POORTEN, Royal Dutch Netherland East Indies Army.

3. On the 11th March, 1942, I proceeded to BANDOENG with Air Vice Marshal MALTBY and after spending the night in the Dutch Headquarters at BANDOENG, visited the Japanese Staff who had established themselves in the PHILANGA HOTEL, BANDOENG. Air Vice Marshal MALTBY and I proceeded back to GILLOET with the Japanese terms. On approximately 16th March, 1942, I was ordered by Air Vice Marshal MALTBY to form an Advance Headquarters at a Railway Station at TUBATU near GAROLT, where we were to work as Railway Control Officers to pass the entire British Force in groups of 600 through to the BATAVIA area. On approximately 18th March, 1942, Air Vice Marshal MALTBY was injured in a car accident and was taken to the Allied Hospital, Bandoeng, and that evening Air Commodore STANON and Group Captain BISHOP were ordered to the Japanese Headquarters, Bandoeng, from which trip they did not return. The Japanese under a Major SAKITO were demanding much information which under the terms of my orders from Air Vice Marshal MALTBY, I could not give and I sent a dispatch rider to Air Commodore SILLY, who was located at Tasik Malaja, with a force of approximately 2000 unarmed airmen. Air Commodore SILLY arrived that evening and took command. Two days later, I left with Air Commodore SILLY and proceeded to Tasik Malaja where we located in a house pending the arrangement that the Japanese said they would make under the terms of which Air Commodore SILLY and his Staff (of which I was a member) would co-operate with the Japanese Headquarters and the International Red Cross Representatives for the general co-ordination of the Japanese plans in respect of the prisoners of war taken in Java.

3A. Two days later, I was taken ill with Malign Tertiary Malaria and sent by the Principal Medical Officer, Wing Commander C. COFFEY, R.A.F., to the Allied Hospital Bandoeng, at that time commanded by Lieutenant Colonel DUMIOP, Australian Medical Service. Two days later I was transferred by the Japanese to a hospital at TJIMAHU, where I remained as a patient for two months.

4. I then returned to Tasik Malaja on or about the 15th May, 1942, remaining there for two weeks, accommodated in a hangar on the aerodrome and then proceeded with all other personnel by train to SOERABAYA, where 1500 officers and men of the British force were accommodated in extremely cramped conditions in the Soerabaya Grammar School. The Camp Commander, working under the Japanese, was Wing Commander VINES, Royal Air Force. Seven months later, the command having changed in the meantime to Wing Commander WEICH, R.A.F., I proceeded to the Darma Camp, also in Soerabaya, where conditions were extremely good. I remained there for six weeks and was then transferred to Yarmart Camp, in central Soerabaya, under the command of Captain BLOOM, Royal Dutch Netherlands East Indies Army. I remained there until the middle of April, 1943, when I was transferred to the Tjimahi Camp, near Bandoeng, commanded by Commander HOOT, R.D.N.E.I.A. I remained there for six weeks and was transferred to the Bandoeng Camp under the Commander of Wing Commander NICHOLIS, R.A.F. On 28th December 1943, I was transferred with the whole of the personnel of the Bandoeng Camp to the Cycle Camp, Batavia, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel IANCLING, R.D.N.E.I. Army where I remained until my departure in May, 1944, as commander of the draft of 2000 men posted to an unknown destination.



5. The Japanese Officers who within my certain knowledge were personally responsible for bad living conditions and ill treatment were:- Colonel KAWABE, who had been commander of all P.O.Ws in the Soerabaya area and who had consistently refused the appeals of Allied Officers for medicine and food (See report of Wing Commander, C. COFFEY, R.A.F. Principal Medical Officer Soerabaya Camps), and Lieutenant SONI, who was commander of the Cycle Camp, and who in my presence wilfully maltreated prisoners of war and who has a record of unparalleled cruelty in the Batavia area. (See report of Wing Commander NICHOLLS, R.A.F. and Lieutenant Colonel VANDERPOST, Intelligence Corps, British Army). I cannot give further detailed reports on Japanese in Java as I was never in a position to obtain exact details, but the Allied Officers referred to above, especially Lt. Col. VANDERPOST, have been in a position to obtain detailed facts of the whole area. A valuable report has been submitted to the Allied Headquarters, South East Asia, by Lt. Col. LILLEY, R.A.M.C. who was the doctor commanding the Allied Hospital Batavia for approximately three years.

6. Colonel KAWABE is a small, wizened Japanese Officer, approximately five feet tall and of typical Japanese appearance. Lieutenant SONI, on the other hand, is young, approximately 30 years old, and extremely smart in his appearance, but walks with a pronounced swagger. He is rather handsome and is about five feet nine inches, of athletic appearance and is decidedly non-Japanese in facial characteristics. I cannot remember the names of the Commanders of the individual Soerabaya Camps but KAWABE was Supreme Commander of the area for General S. ITO whose Headquarters were in Singapore. The Tjamahi Camp was commanded by 1st Lieutenant YAMAGUCHI, another brutal officer on whom Major HOOT will report. The Bandoeng Camp by Captain TCHAKAGI, an officer who did not control his guards but who was not responsible for any atrocities as far as I know. (See report Wing Commander NICHOLLS and Lieutenant Colonel VANDERPOST). The Cycle Camp was commanded by Lieutenant SONI (See para 5 above).

#### SUMMITRA DRAFT.

7. [On 1st March 1944, a draft was selected by the Japanese from personnel of the Cycle Camp, Batavia, consisting of 2 battalions of 1000 men each, comprising in total approximately 1750 Dutch and 250 English.] No. 1 Battalion was commanded by Wing Commander WIGHTWICK R.A.F., and No. 2 Battalion by Lieut. Col. IBBEKHOORN, R.D.N.E.I. Army. The personnel of this draft was segregated from the rest of the Camp and placed on extra rations. Numerous dysentery tests were made (approximately one per week) and a very casual effort was made to re-kit personnel, but as nearly all the clothing issued was Dutch pattern uniforms intended for small native troops, very little could be utilised by the personnel on the draft. Towards the end of April, 1944, Wing Commander WIGHTWICK was admitted to the Camp Hospital suffering from dysentery, and I volunteered to take his place. I applied to Captain TCHAKAGI, the Japanese Commander of the draft, and when I explained that a large percentage of the British troops proceeding on the draft had previously been under my command, he accepted me as draft Commander.

8. [On the morning of the 14th May, 1944, the party marched with full kit from the Cycle Camp to Pasir Sinan Station, Batavia and entrained for Tandjong Frick docks. There we embarked on a Japanese transport of approximately 5000 tons; 1000 men including all the British being accommodated in the forward hold and the remaining 1000 Dutch personnel in the aft hold. By application to Captain TCHIKAGI, I was allowed to bring the personnel of the forward hold on to the deck for Physical training in batches of 50 for 15 minutes at a time and I obtained permission to use one of the ships pumps for the men to bathe. Food and tea were available. The accommodation in the hold was extremely cramped, the men sitting upright with their legs round the men in front of them. Numerous cases of prostration had to be brought on deck, especially during the midday hours. The guards were not troublesome during the journey. The ship was in convoy with two other ships of approximately 5000 tons each, escorted by a Japanese corvette, with one Japanese bomber as aerial cover. Our sister ships were carrying approximately 5000 Javanese coolies under disgusting conditions. No incidents occurred during the voyage.

9. On the evening of the 17th May, 1944, we docked at PADANG, Sumatra, and disembarked and marched approximately 12 kilometres to a disused cinema. No food was provided and no lavatory accommodation being available in the cinema. The following morning we marched a further 8 kilometers to the Padang Civil Gaol, where we were accommodated where normally 500 native prisoners were confined, we had 2000 of our draft and approximately 1500 of the Indonesian coolies that had arrived in our convoy. All these coolies were suffering from disease, mostly dysentery (both bacillary and amoebic) and a form of conjunctivitis. They were dying in large numbers. No lavatory accommodation was available and the drains of the gaol were full of blood from the defecation of the Indonesians. I called for volunteers to dig latrines and we attempted to clear the portion of the Camp that had been allotted to ourselves. A meal of approximately 200 grams of rice only was given to us at about 1800 hours, and at 2000 hours I was instructed to leave with my battalion (1000 men) for an unknown destination. We marched out, carrying with us approximately 200 grams of rice per man and marched about 6 kilometres to the railhead where we entrained in terribly crowded conditions and proceeded 124 kilometres to Paya Komboe. There we were met by Japanese motor transport and driven a further 150 kilometres to Pekan Baroe, where we were accommodated in a Camp which had contained Indonesians and which was indescribably filthy. I appealed to the Japanese Commander for food and was told that none was available. The following day the whole party were set to work to clean up the Camp and at approximately 1600 hours a meal of rice pap only (kind of porridge) was issued. The following day at 8 a.m. 900 men left the Camp and commenced work on the railway. They had to work extremely hard carrying sleepers, rails, and working with four pound hammers throughout the entire day, without food or shelter.

10. Although we were completely inexperienced in this type of work, our overseers were a group of Japanese soldiers straight from the Burma railway prisoner of war gangs and the same slave driving conditions and brutality was adopted. The men returned to Camp at approximately 9 p.m. and after the

privations of the journey from Batavia, they were utterly exhausted but the Japanese explained that they could not give us any further food until our rations arrived. For the next five days, the situation remained unchanged. I personally experienced considerable trouble with the Japanese Lieutenant (1st Lieut. TANAKA) because of the rise in sickness. I explained that unless we received food, no improvement could be expected and the water that we were compelled to drink was extremely bad because it came from sulphur springs. At the end of the five days mentioned above, a Japanese Colonel whose name I never knew but who was completely responsible for the railway construction in Pagan Baroe at that time, visited the Camp. He was an old man with gray hair and had a pronounced stoop and he told me that I must do my utmost to promote the welfare of the men under my command. I explained the ration and water situation to him and told him that the working hours were much too long. The Interpreter stated that the Colonel could do nothing about these working hours but that he would look into the food situation. That evening I heard that Lt. Col. SLABBEKOORN, with the remaining 1000 men had arrived at a Camp approximately three kilometres away. The following day our food supplies arrived and the day after, I moved with my men on a transfer of all the personnel from my Camp to Lt. Col. SLABBEKOORN's camp and Col. SLABBEKOORN, with his men, to my Camp.

11. The heavy working parties continued despite a dysentery outbreak which the Allied doctors attributed to the conditions in the Padang gaol.) On the 24th July, 1944, approximately 20 kilometres of rail had been completed and I was instructed to post the first five railway gangs, each comprising 50 men, to the Camp known as Camp three approximately 15 kilometres distant from my Camp in the direction of Padang. The draft left under the Command of Lieutenant DALLAS, 3rd Hussars, and was joined a few days later by an additional 150 British under the command of Captain ARMSTRONG, R.A.S.C., who took over command of the Camp on arrival.

12. By this time I had arranged for limited canteen facilities for the local purchase of extra food when available and I was responsible for Camp 3 as well as my own. Lt. Col. SLABBEKOORN's Camp being No. 1 Camp, mine No. 2 Camp and Captain ARMSTRONG's No. 3 Camp, all administered from my Camp. It was extremely difficult to administer these Camps as I was not allowed freedom of action by the Japanese and two thirds of the personnel under my command being Dutch with a very limited knowledge of the English language. The medium of expression with the Japanese was the Malay language and with the Dutch Malay, French or English in that order. I therefore formed a Camp Committee of the responsible Dutchmen to assist myself and my Adjutant Lieut. der HARTOG, in administering the whole group.

13. At about this time, Captain TCHAKAGI, sent for me and explained that he was returning to Java, with our Korean guards, and that we would be handed over to the control of Japanese civilians and Japanese guards and would come directly under the South Manchurian Railway Company. Two days afterwards he handed over to Captain MIYASAKI, who arrived from Medan accompanied by Lieutenant DOI. MIYASAKI assumed command of all prisoner of war camps in the Pagan Baroe area and DOI was in command of No. 2 Camp. Towards the end of



July, 1944, a further draft of prisoners of war comprising approximately 150 Officers and 100 men arrived in No. 2 Camp from Singapore - these men being the survivors of the draft that left Medan, Sumatra, for Singapore and were torpedoed en route (See report Captain J. G. GORDON, R.A. an eye-witness to the incident.) In addition we were informed that further drafts had arrived ex. Singapore and had opened up two further Camps (Nos. 4 and 5) and these were also placed under my administration. At about this time, [I was informed that No. 2 Camp was to officially be the sick Camp, all fit men to be sent working on the railway from the up-country camps and all sick being returned to me until fit enough to act as replacements or to work from my Camp. Wing Commander COFFEY, Senior Medical Officer, and I made repeated appeals to the Japanese (Captain MIYASAKI) for improved conditions, less work, more food and medicines, but all our appeals were of no avail as we were informed that food was not available and Doctor ISHII, the Japanese doctor in charge of P.O.W. Camps, told Wing Commander COFFEY that as medicine was not available we must grow our own herbs and make our own. The less heavy sick were forced to do garden work as Lieutenant DOI said that the ration situation would deteriorate due to lack of transport to convey the rations from BANGKINANG, the nearest town approximately 65 kilometres distant. The Allied doctors experienced extreme difficulty in dealing with the heavy number of sick, at this period about 800; mostly dysentery, malaria, beri-beri, avitaminotic diseases, pellagra and some tuberculosis, and in addition, a large number of tropical ulcer cases. Practically no medicine or dressings were available.] (See reports of Lt. Col. HENNESSY, R.A.M.C. and Wing Commander COFFEY, R.A.F.)

14. [On about 17th September, 1944, I was ordered to anticipate the arrival of a further number of seriously sick cases and I heard from a Korean guard that a further draft had been torpedoed between Java and Padang with very heavy casualties. On approximately the 19th September, 1944, two ambulances arrived with some 20 cases, most of whom died within a day or two. I was told that the remainder were in the gaol at Padang and in the Padang hospital. However, the remaining personnel were posted to Camps 4 and 5 and approximately one week later, 150 sick and dying men arrived in the middle of the night in my camp. At this period, although we had received no clothing for nearly three years, I was ordered by the Japanese to produce as much clothing as possible for the draft mentioned above as the Japanese explained that as the British had sunk this convey and as the Japanese could not produce clothing, we must provide it ourselves. This was done to the best of our ability but the conditions at Camp 4 were extremely bad.] The Commander of Camp 4 was Captain KROON, R.D.N.E.I. Army and Captain ROSIER, R.D.N.E.I. Army was in charge of Camp 5.

15. [At the end of November, 1944, I was informed that a Camp 6 had been established with the personnel who had left Medan some eight months previously for road construction work in Atjeh, North Sumatra, where they had been commanded by a Japanese Officer, Lieut. MIRA, an English speaking Japanese, and "an extremely bad type."] (See reports Captain GORDON, R.A. and Lieut. HEDLEY, Johore ~~Malaya~~). [These men arrived in a very debilitated condition but nevertheless, were put on the railway construction work immediately.]

Lieutenant MURA visited my Camp and asked me for a senior British Officer to command the British personnel in his Camp, the Dutch being under the command of Captain van der LANDE, an extremely efficient Dutch Officer now commanding Sumatra under British Administration. I posted Captain GORDON to command the British in No. 6 Camp and he left that day accompanied by Lieut. MURA.

16. At this period, the general situation regarding prisoners of war was deteriorating rapidly and I again made repeated appeals to Lieutenant DOI for an improvement in the situation. The appeals were all refused. We produced statistical reports showing the increasing death rate rising to approximately 80 per month was entirely due to lack of food and heavy work, but Lieut. DOI merely informed me that he considered that all the Officers should be made to do more work and that I and my staff were merely trying to sabotage the Japanese war efforts. These conditions deteriorated further and the death rate rose due to the constant exchange of personnel from the up country camps who had fallen sick who were replaced by only semi-fit men from No. 2 Camp.

17. On approximately 16th June, 1945, I was informed that the railway must be finished by the 15th August, 1945, and that every available man who could walk must be sent out to work. Despite our protests, medical parades were held by the Japanese and the men were forced out to work. The health situation of the whole area was now deteriorating with great rapidity, no medicine was available and the whole group was utterly exhausted and all personnel were extremely depressed due to constant slave driving by the Japanese guards and railway officials. Increased supervision by the Kempetai (Japanese Secret Police) was felt and all sorts of additional disciplinary pressure was brought to bear on us.]

18. At this point, the Japanese guards in Camp 2 were replaced by Korean guards and the illicit buying of foodstuffs increased and life inside the Camp became more bearable as the Koreans' attitude, although not pro-Ally, was definitely anti-Japanese. This state of affairs continued until our release.

19. I submitted a detailed report of war criminals to Major GLOUGH, attached to the Intelligence Branch, Force 136, SEAC Headquarters, Goodwood Park Hotel, Singapore, and appended below are the names and description of the major criminals responsible for our condition in Sumatra during the 18 months that I commanded there.

CAPTAIN MIYASAKI. In charge of all Prisoner of War Camps in the Pakan Baroe Area. A fat officer of medium height with a pronounced squint. He showed no interest whatsoever in the welfare of the Camps and although fully aware of the situation, gave us no assistance and was in fact always insolent whenever approached.



1st LIEUTENANT DOI, Camp Commander No. 2 Camp and Captain MIYASAKI's Adjutant. Another fat officer of medium height. Aged approximately 38 and according to my information, a watchmaker before the war. He was solely responsible for the extreme pressure put upon the men. He visited the Camp on numerous occasions and when groups of sick men were pointed out to him, he merely laughed and said we were but prisoners of war. A bestial type who had no control whatsoever over his guards.

1st LIEUTENANT (DOCTOR) ISHII, Medical Officer all prisoner of war Camps Pakin Baroe Area. A short Japanese Officer wearing glasses. A medical student before the war. Although fully aware of the critical situation expressed himself incapable of improving the conditions, and although he stated that no medicines or dressing were available, he had a large stock for Japanese consumption and after the capitulation produced a very large quantity of the drugs we had so urgently requested.

SERGEANT KATO, Camp Sergeant No. 2 Camp in January/February, 1944. He was a bestial slave driver who took extreme delight in forcing sick men out to work. He placed all possible restrictions on the Camps and severely punished any infringement of the most trivial order. He was responsible for stopping all meat issues to the Camp for a period of over five weeks. He was a heavily built country type of Japanese and was extremely powerful. (Last unit MINOTAI).

SERGEANT KITAGAWA, Camp Sergeant No. 2 Camp from March, 1944 to July, 1944. Was if possible worse than his predecessor. Was unapproachable and had a particular hatred for the sick and for Officers. He took great delight in forcing sick men out to work and his favorite form of punishment was to make a man hold an extremely heavy piece of wood above his head for a long period. He agitated his guards to punish prisoners severely for any infringements of the rules.] At times, he completely stopped all canteen purchases but at other times purchased large quantities of eggs and beef for the camp - his only redeeming feature. Another extremely powerful country type of Japanese, very heavily built and of medium height. (Last unit MIYASAKITAI).

1st Class Soldier KATO, (Last unit MINOTAI). A schoolmaster before the war. Slim, of medium height, wearing glasses and an extremely narrow face. Made a practice of beating prisoners of war and making them stand to attention in front of him for long periods each time he was on guard. Named: Four-eyes, Blue-Shirt.

KOREAN GUARD MATSUDA, (Miyasakitai) was in charge of transport in No. 2 Camp Headquarters. Was an extremely reckless driver who frequently injured POWs through his carelessness. On one occasion, throw four prisoners of war from his truck due to bad driving and immediately afterwards made all the occupants of the truck parade for check. As one of them could not stand properly to attention as he had been injured in the accident, MATSUDA struck him across the face with his torch causing a fracture of the jaw. The P.O.W. in question was L.A.C. DR. PER, R.N.F. MATSUDA was a tall, slim Korean with a long record of brutality towards prisoners of war.

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2nd Class SOLDIER FUJI. (Last Unit: MINOTAI). A very short, stocky, wide faced Japanese. By far the worst guard in my experience as a prisoner of war. He took an extreme delight in bestial actions and has a record of beating someone on every occasion that he came inside the Camp. As in the case of Dutch soldier MOLEMA, who suffering with an extremely large ulcer on the left leg which had just commenced to heal, was approached by FUJI, who demanded to know why he did not stand up when a Japanese soldier approached. MOLEMA showed the ulcer on his leg and was immediately kicked upon it by FUJI. The result of this attack was the amputation some three days after and the death of MOLEMA some three weeks later due to weakness and shock. The witness to this attack is Lieutenant (Doctor) KINGMA, Dutch Netherlands Medical Service. Nicknamed: Tiger of Pagan, Baron Flowerpot, Napoleon.  
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1st CLASS SOLDIER YUNADA (Last unit MINOTAI). One of the guard commanders of No. 2 Camp who assisted FUJI in most of his attacks. Like KITAGAWA delighted in making sick men hold large pieces of wood above their heads for long periods. A Japanese of above average height, heavily built and wore thick lens glasses. He was responsible for many totally unnecessary brutal attacks.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant.

(Sgd) F.S. DAVIS

Wing Commander, R.A.F. ]

↑  
[ 19.11.1945.  
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No. 1

Ex 1769

EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT # 5604

書類第五〇四号

口供書

余英国空軍(パイロット)第三九八二号空軍中佐現駐「スエーデン」  
英国空軍部隊第一〇六常設休養部所屬「エセ」州  
「リ」オニ「リ」「リ」オニ「リ」ニ番地、本籍地「リ」ドハースト  
四十二日間、復員休暇中ナリ「バトリック・スティー・デヴィス」ハ宣誓  
上以下、事ヲ述ル  
今取去サレ余ニ見セラレ「P.S.D.」ト「リ」リ「リ」報告書ハ一九四五年十月  
十九日、余ニ依ツテ作ラレタ。一九四三年三月八日より一九四五年九月廿日  
間、「ジャ」及ビ「スマ」ニ於テ日本、戦争犯罪ニ関スル報告書ヲ  
アル。報告書ニ述ベラレタ事實ハ眞実デ然ラザル旨ガ陳ベラレタ箇所  
以外ハ余、直接、知識ニ依ル。  
一九四五年十月十九日、「ウエストミンスター」市「スプリング・ガーデンズ」番  
地ニ前述「バトリック・スティー・デヴィス」ニ依リ宣誓サレタモノナリ。

(署名)「バトリック・スティー・デヴィス」

法律部員陸軍中佐「コーブラット」ノ面前ニテ  
「ロンドン」市「S.W.1」陸軍省、法務長官事務所  
余ハ本書ハ口供書原本ハ眞實、寫ニタルコトヲ證明ス。

法務長官事務局法律部員

陸軍中佐「コーブラット」ノ署名

Doc 5604

是よりロンドン市S.W.1.陸軍省法務長官事務局法律部員  
「J. バラック」中佐、面前ニテ、一九四五年本土月十九日宣誓す。  
空軍中佐「バトリック・スティー・テイラー」は、口供書、中ニ言及せし  
「P. S. D.」ニトシタル報告書アリ。

Doc

「ジャック・スマー」日本軍ノ下ニ於ケル三年半、俘虜生活ニ  
自スル英國空軍、空軍中佐「J. イー・エス・テイラー」報告書  
一九四二年三月八日乃至一九四五年九月廿日

余空軍中佐、英國空軍「パイロット」第三九六二号  
現在「コズフォード」英國空軍部隊第一〇六、常設休養部  
所屬ニテ「エセックス州」「イー・オン・ニ」「クリフ・バート」ニ。養地  
ノ本籍地「ハリッド・バース」デ四十二日間、復員休暇中、  
「バトリック・スティー・テイラー」以下、事ヲ報告ス。

七、一九四四年三月一日、日本軍ニ依リ、「バタヴィヤ」市、サモ  
収容所、人員中より總數約千七百五十名、和蘭人二百五  
十名、英國人ト包含スル、各々、千名ヅ、二大隊ヲ成ル別働  
隊ガ撰抜サレタ。

八、一九四四年五月十四日、朝、部隊八身廻品全部ヲ持テ、サモ  
収容所「ワタウィヤ」ハ「バール・リッ」ニ停車場（行進シタム）  
「プリック」波止場ヘ汽車ヲ送ラセタ。其處ニ我々約五千噸、  
日本ノ輸送船ニ乗船セタ。英國兵全部ヲ含ム千名ハ前部、  
大船ニ残り、千名、和蘭兵ハ後部、船艙ニ収容セタ。サモ  
大尉ニ申出デ、余ハ前部船艙、兵隊ヲ五千人宛、組デ「回」ニ  
宛テ保、為ニ申役ニ連シ出ス。トテ許可セシ、兵隊、水浴、為  
船「ボート」ニツテ使用スル許可ヲ得タ。食物ト茶ハ得タ。  
船艙、宿所ハ非常ニ劣悪ナリ、兵隊、自命、前三居ル兵隊  
、圍リニ其ノ定タ出シテ、與直ニ坐シ、トシ、トシ、カク。

No. 2

極度之痕跡アリ。患着ヲ甲板ニ度々連シ出サシムベカラナカシク。之ニ應書同殊ニ多シ。航海中、監視兵ハシガリナカシ。其船各約五千噸、他二隻ハ船員共ニ日本ノ海防艦ニ護衛サレ日本ノ暴撃機ニ掩護モトシテ送リテ居タ。我々姉妹船ハ全嫌状態、約五千名ノ瓜哇人苦力ヲ乗テ居テ航海中、何モ事件モ起ラナカシ。

九、一九四四年五月十七日、タリ。我々ハスモトラ、バダングニ入港。下船ニ約十二料歩イテ使用サテ居テ映画館到着シタ。食物ハ與ヘラズ、映画館中デ、便所設備ハ無カシ。翌朝、我々更ニハ料歩イテ、バダング一般入監獄ニテ、普通通五百名ノ土人囚徒が監禁サレ所ニ收容サレタ。我々我ガ別働隊二千名ト同ジ護送船ニ到着シタ。約一千五百名ノインドネシア人苦力ヲ有シテ居タ。之等ノ苦力ハ比日病氣、主ニ赤痢(細菌性及ビアメーバ性共)ト一種結膜炎ニ罹ツテ居タ。彼等、多数死ニテ行ツタ。便所ノ設備ハ得ラズ、監獄ノ下水溝ハインドネシア人ノ排泄物ノ血ヲ杯デアツタ。余ハ便所ヲ掘ニ為シ有ルモ甚ナリ。我々當ガハタ收容所ノ部分ヲ清潔ニセウシタ。十八時頃約二百瓦許リノ米ノ食事が與ヘラタダデアツタ。ソレニ二十時ニ余余部隊(千名)ヲ率イテ不明ノ目的地ニ向テ出發スルヤウニ命ゼラシタ。我々ハ人約二百瓦米ヲ持テ出發シタ。六料程、末端停車場ニ至リ、其處ニ我々ハヒドク混ミ合タ。汽車ニ乗セラル。バヤコムブニテ百二十四料進マタ。其處ニ我々ハ日本ノ輸送自動車ニ迎ヘテ更ニ百八料バカハルシテ運バシタ。其處ニ我々前ニインドネシア人ヲ入テ、形容之難キ程ノ不潔ノ收容所ニ入ラシタ。余ハ日本ノ指揮官ニ食物ノ給與ヲ懇願シタガ、何モ無イトエバシタ。



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NO. 3

極度之疲勞なり。患者ヲ甲板ニ度々運出サシメバテラナカッタ。之ニ眞晝  
同發シ多ク。航海中、監視兵ハシテナカッタ。其ニ船各約五千噸、他二  
隻ノ船ト共ニ日本ノ海防艦ヲ護衛サレ、日本ノ暴撃機ヲ掩護モトシテ  
送リテ居タ。我々姉妹船ハ全ク嫌ハ状態、主約五千名、瓜哇人苦力ヲ乗  
テ居タ。航海中、何ノ事モ起ラナカッタ。

九、一九四四年五月十七日、タリ、我々ハスモトラ、パンダング、ニ入港。  
下船ニ約十二料歩イテ使用サレテ居テ映画館ヲ着シ。食物  
ハ與ヘラズ、映画館中デ、便所設備ハ無カッタ。翌五朝、我々更ニ  
ハ料歩イテ、パンダング一般入監獄ニテ、普通五百名、土人囚徒が監  
禁サレテ所収容セラタ。我々我ガ別働隊二千名ト同ジ護送船ヲ到  
着シ約一千五百名ハインドネシア人苦力ヲ有シテ居タ。之等苦力  
ハ比留病氣、主ニ赤痢(細菌性及ビアメーバ性共)ト一種結膜炎ニ  
罹ツテ居タ。彼等、多数死ニテ行ツタ。便所、設備ハ得ラズ、監  
獄下水溝ハインドネシア人、排泄物、血ヲ一杯デアツタ。余ハ便所ヲ  
掘ニテ有テモ、我々ニ當ガリテ收容所部分ヲ清潔ニセウツタ。  
十一時頃約二百瓦許リ米食事が與ヘラタゲデアツタ。ソレニテ二十時ニ余  
余部隊(千名)ヲ率イテ不明ノ目的地ニ向テ出發スルヤウニ命ゼラタ。  
我々一人約二百瓦米ヲ持ツテ出發シタ。六料程、末端停車場ニ到  
テ其處ニ我々ハヒドク混ミ合タ。汽車ニ乗セラル。バヤコンブーニ  
デ百二十四料進ムタ。其處ニ我々ハ日本ノ輸送自動車ニ迎ヘラ、更  
ニ百八料「カネハ」ニテ運バシタ。其處ニ我々前ニインドネシア人  
ヲ入テ形容ノ難キ程不潔ナ收容所ニ入ラタ。余ハ日本、指揮  
官ニ食物、給與ヲ總願シタガ、何モ無イトエバシタ。

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翌日、全部隊ハ收容所ヲ清掃セラルシ、十六時頃粥ノ食事ヲ  
 ガ支給サレタ。翌日午前八時、二九百名ノ者ガ收容所カラ出掛ケテ鐵  
 道ノ仕事ヲ始メタ。彼等ハ食物モ遮護物モ無ク枕木線路ヲ運シ  
 タリ終日四時度ノ金槌ヲ仕事ラスルナド、非常ニ激シク勞働ヲサセラレタ。  
 十、我々ハ此ノ稱ナシ仕事ニハ全ク無經驗デアツタニモ拘ハラズ我々ノ監  
 督ハ「ビルマ」鐵道俘虜隊カラ直接来タ一群ノ日本兵デ同様ノ奴隷  
 ヲ使フガ如キ苛酷ナ状態ト鐵行ガ採用サレタ。兵隊ハ午後九時頃  
 收容所ニ歸シテ来タガ「バクガイヤ」カラ旅行ノ艱難、後デ、彼等ハ  
 スツカリ疲レ果テテキマシタガ、日本兵ハ我々ノ食糧ガ来ルマデ、之以上  
 食事ヲ支給スル事ハ出来ナイト説明シタ。次ノ五日間、其ノ状態ハ其  
 ノハ續イタ。余自身モ疾病發生ノ為、日本人中尉(田中中尉)ト少  
 カラズ争ヒマシタ。余ハ、我々が食事ヲ支給サレナイ限り何等ノ改善ハ  
 期待スルコトハ出来ズ又我々ノ飲マサレテ居ル水ハ硫黄臭カラ来テ  
 居ル為非常ニ惡イ事ヲ説明シタ。

其ノ夜、余ハ「スラベクーン」中佐ガ残リノ千名ヲ連シテ約三時隔ツタ所ノ  
 收容所ニ到着シタ事ヲ聞イタ。翌日、我々ノ食糧ガ到着シ其次自余ハ余  
 ノ收容所ノ全員ト「スラベクーン」中佐ノ收容所ノ全員ノ人ト變リ、為余ノ部下ヲ  
 連シテ移ツタ。

No. 4

一、聯合軍士医師ガ「バンドン」監獄ノ状態ノ為「アルト」シタ赤痢ノ發生ニモ  
 関ハス又重労働部隊ハ續イタ。

一三、……才ニ收容所ハ公式ニ病人收容所トナリ、働ケル者ハ皆奥地ノ  
 收容所カラ鐵道ニ働キニヤラシ、病人ハ皆交代者トナリ得ル程度ニ恢復スルカ、  
 又ハ余ノ收容所カラ働キニ行ケル程度ニナルマデ余ノ下ニ送り歸サルト云フ  
 事ヲ通告サレタ。

5604

先任軍医將校にコライシ空軍中佐ト余ハ状態、改善  
 仕テ、軽減、食糧ト医薬、増量ヲ保リ返シ、日本兵(富崎  
 大尉)ニ嘆願シテ、我々、文等、嘆願ハ何、甲斐モナク、  
 食糧ハ得ラレナイト云ハレ、又俘虜收容所担当ノ日本人医  
 師ノ石井兵師ハコライシ空軍中佐ニ、薬ヲ手入レルコトハ出来  
 ナイカラ、自分デ薬量ヲ裁断シ、自分、薬ヲ作ラナクビナラナイト  
 ミハレル如キヲ云フ。  
 料隔ツク一町近イ町、バングンカラ食糧ヲ運ブ、輸  
 送機関、不足、為、食糧事情ハ悪化スルト云ハルヲハテ、  
 重病デタイ者ハ自らはりラセネバナラナカツク。聯合軍医  
 師ハ、非常ニ多数ノ病人ヲ扱フニ非常ナ困難ヲシク。  
 当时八百名許リデ、其、大部分ハ赤痢、マラリヤ、脚気、  
 「アウイト」ニ、テイツク、病、蜀黍系斑病、少数、結核患者  
 デ、其、ニカフルニ多数、他、肺腫物患者ガナク。薬トカ  
 綑帯トカ、金トキニ入ラナカツク。

十四、一九四四年、九月十七日頃、余ハ更ニ多数ノ重病患者、  
 到着ヲ豫期スル様ニト命ゼラレ、余ハ朝鮮人監視兵カラ、  
 瓜哇ト「バダング」間デ、後援別働隊ガ魚雷攻撃ヲ受ケ、  
 多数ノ死傷者ヲ出シタラナク。一九四四年、九月十九日頃、

二台ノ傷病兵運搬自動車デ、二十名バカリ、患者ガ到着シタガ、  
 大部分ハ一日カ、二日デ死シタ。残、者ハ「バダング」監獄ヤ  
 「バダング」病院ニ入シラレタラナク。然、シ、残リ、者達ハ、  
 第四第五收容所ニ送ラレ、凡ソ一週間後、百五十名ノ病人ヤ  
 死ニ瀕シタ者ガ、具夜中ニ余ノ收容所ニ到着シタ。

No.5



504

甚、頃、我々ハ殆、ド三年間、衣服、支給ヲ受ケタリガナカツ  
ニモ拘ハラズ、余ハ、創、述、別、働、隊、為、ニ出、来、ル、ダ、ケ、被、服  
ヲ出、ス、称、ニ日本、軍、ニ命、セ、ラ、レ、タ、日本、軍、説、明、ニ依、レ、バ、  
英、軍、が、此、護、送、船、ヲ、撃、沈、シ、タ、デ、ア、リ、又、日本、軍、ハ、被、  
服、ヲ、支、給、ス、ル、コ、ト、が、出、来、サ、イ、カ、ラ、我、々、ハ、自、分、デ、支、給、セ、ネ、バ、  
ナ、ラ、又、ト、云、ツ、タ、我、々、ハ、出、来、ル、ダ、ケ、一、リ、ヲ、シ、タ、ガ、第、四、收、容、  
所、ノ、事、情、ハ、非、常、ニ、悪、カ、ツ、タ、

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No. 6

5604

甚、傾、我々ハ船中三年間衣服、支給ヲ受ケタリガナカツ  
ニモ拘ハラズ。余ハ前記、別働隊、爲ニ出来ルダケ、被服  
ヲ出スルニ日本軍ニ命ゼラレタ。日本軍、説明ニ依レバ、  
英軍が此ノ護送船ヲ撃沈シタリデアリ。又日本軍ハ被  
服ヲ支給スルコトが出来ナイカラ、我々ハ自命ヲ支給セネバ  
ナラヌト云ツタ。我々ハ出来ルダケ、着タシタガ、第四收容  
所ノ事情ハ非常ニ悪カラタ。

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No. 6

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十五、九四年十一月末余、北ス、トウ「ア、テ」道路構築作業ニ従事ス、爲  
 八ヶ月程前「メ、テ」立ツ者ヲ以テ第一收容所が出来タ事ヲ通告  
 サシタ。彼等、北ス、トウ「テ、ハ」英語ヲ話し、極悪心、形、日本人將校「ム、  
 中尉」指揮ヲ仰イデ居タ。  
 之等、者、非常ニ衰弱状態ニテヤツテ来タガソレニモ拘ハツ、且、速、鐵道  
 建設作業ヲサセ、シタ。「ム、中尉」余ヲ訪問シ、彼、收容所、英國兵ヲ  
 指揮スル為、先任英國將校ヲ求メタ。和蘭兵、非常ニ有能ナ、和蘭  
 將校「現、在、英國統治下ニ」ス、トウ「指揮」ニナル「アン、デ、ル、ラン、ジ」  
 大尉、指揮下ニアツタ。余、亦、第一收容所、英國兵ヲ指揮スル為ニ「  
 ル、ト、ジ」大尉ヲ求メ、彼、其、自「ム、中尉」ニ伴ヒテ去ツテ行ツタ。

十六、此頃、傷虜ニ因ル一般状況、多ク速ニ悪化シテ居テ、余、再、上、任、中尉ニ狀  
 況改善ヲ繰リ返シテ嘆願シタ。嘆願、全ク拒否セリタ。我々、六月、約、十名  
 ト云フ、死亡、率、一、日、毎、金、ノ、食糧、不足ト過激ナ労働トニ依ルモ、ア、ハ、ト  
 フ示ス統計報告書ヲ提出シタガ上、任、中尉、唯、余ニ將校ニモツトは事  
 ヲサセルベキナト又、余ト余、幕僚、四、名、日本、戦争、完、遂、ヲ妨害シテ居  
 ン、ト云フ、云、云、之等、情、勢、力、更ニ悪化シ、又、輿、地、收容所、ヲ、病、氣ニ  
 罹、ル、者、ト第一收容所、半、ニ健康ニツ、テ来タ者、ト、絶、エ、ス、軍、団、ト換、ヘ、  
 為、ニ死亡、率、高、ナリタ。

No. 7

十七、九五年六月十六日頃、余、一九四五年八月十五日迄ニ鐵道ハ完成ナリ、レ、  
 ナラズ、其、為、歩、行、事、出来、ン、者、ハ皆、仕事ニ出ナケレバ、ナ、ラ、イ、ト通告サシ  
 タ。我々、抗議ニモ拘ラズ、日本人ニ依ル医療上、崗、兵、ガ、ツ、リ、兵、隊、ニ無  
 理ニ仕事ニ出サシタ。



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全地域、健康状態、今や急速に悪化し、あり、薬、全然手に入らず、全  
隊、全々、疲れて果て、日本監視兵と鉄道官吏、絶望的酷使、為三全、人々、非  
常に意氣沮丧して居る。憲兵隊監視、加重が感ぜられ、更に種々、規律に圧  
迫が我々に加へられ。

元々、左、余が「スミトラ」で指揮して居る十八ヶ月間、我々、状態、関心、責任、有  
る主犯、犯罪者、名前、及び人相、添へる。

宮崎大尉

「バカン・バル」地、全俘虜收容所、責任者、中背、肥  
た將校、目立って斜視、アツタ。彼、何等收容所、福祉、ハ関心、見  
た。ソレ、其處、状態、ヨク承知して居る。我々、ハ少し、援助、ヲ與へ  
タ。實際、彼、ハ交渉、ヲ持た掛けた。何時、モ横柄、アツタ。

土居中尉

第三收容所、收容所指揮官、宮崎大尉、副官、彼、モ亦、中背、肥、た將校。  
手、オオ、後、余、聞、知、タ、ア、ハ、戦、時、計、屋、ア、タ、事、業、隊、対、ハ、居、全、責任、者、元、  
彼、收容所、ヲ、屢々、訪、病、兵、群、ヲ、指、示、サ、レ、ト、彼、唯、笑、テ、我々、俘虜、ニ、過、キ、イト、言、タ、非、道、  
ト、人間、ヲ、監視、兵、ニ、対、シ、テ、モ、何、等、統、制、力、モ、持、ッ、居、タ、カ、タ。

石井中尉(軍医)

「バカン・バル」地、全收容所、軍医、背、低、眼鏡、ヲ、カ、タ、日本人將校、戦、前、医、学、生、  
急、事、情、ヲ、知、テ、居、ラ、其、状態、ヲ、改善、ス、ル、ハ、出来、ヌ、ト、云、ッ、居、タ、ソ、レ、医、藥、繃、帶、等、ハ、手、未、  
イト、彼、が、言、ッ、タ、モ、カ、ハ、ラ、ズ、日本、軍、ノ、消、費、用、ト、シ、テ、ハ、沢、山、持、ッ、テ、居、リ、降、服、後、ハ、我々、が、斯、ク、モ  
熱、心、ニ、要、求、シ、タ、藥、品、ヲ、非、常、ニ、多、量、ニ、出、シ、タ。

40. 8

加藤軍曹

第三收容所、一九四一年一月及二月、收容所附軍曹、彼、ハ、病人、ヲ、仕、ウ、ニ、追、  
テ、ル、ノ、好、キ、ヲ、非、常、ニ、酷、使、者、ア、タ、タ、彼、ハ、收容所、ニ、凡、ル、可、能、ニ、制、限、ヲ、加、ヘ、最、低、  
網、ヲ、命、令、對、ス、ル、違、犯、ヲ、嚴、シ、ク、罰、シ、タ、五、週、間、以、テ、モ、收容所、ニ、肉、ヲ、交、給、ス、ル、ヲ、差、シ、止、メ、タ、モ、彼、  
責任、ヲ、ハ、レ、彼、ハ、重、々、イ、作、廢、ヲ、田、金、風、日本、今、非、常、ニ、力、ヲ、タ、タ、最、終、時、係、部、隊、司、(監、)

Doc. 5604.

No. 9

北川軍曹 一九四四年三月ヨリ同年七月迄第三收容所、收容  
所附軍曹。ソノ事アリ得ルトスバ彼、前任者ヨリモモト  
要ラツ。近ヅキ難ク、病人及ビ將校ヲ特ニ嫌ミタ。彼、病人  
仕事ニ出ス事ガ好キヲ、彼、好キナ刑罰ハ、非常ニ重イ枝木ヲ長  
時間頭上ニ持タセル事デアッタ。彼、規則ヲ破リテ、傍ハ、服ヲ  
割スヤウニト。監視兵ヲタキ付ケタ。.....

「フジ」二等兵（最終所屬部隊「ミ」隊）非常ニ背、低イ、ジ  
グッタ。幅廣、顔ヲミタ日本兵。子屬トシテ、私、経験中  
ガ最も要イ監視兵。彼、非道ナ行爲ヲスル事ヲ特ニ好ミ。收  
容所、入ッテ来ニ度毎ニ誰カヲ殴ルト云フ記録ヲ持ッテ居タ。  
和蘭兵「モロシ」場合、如ク、左ニ非常ニ大キナ腫物ガ出来  
テ告シテ居タ。ソレガヤト治リケタ時、「フジ」ガ止付イテ  
来タ。日本兵ガ来ニ何故立タナト其、理由ヲ要求シタ。  
「モロシ」ハ、足、腫物ヲ見セタガ勿シ「フジ」ニ其処ヲ蹴ラシタ。  
此、襲撃、結果、三日程後、足、切断サレ、三週間程後「モロシ」  
ハ、衰弱ト激痛、爲、死ニデシッタ。此、襲撃、目撃者、  
和蘭軍醫部「ヤンク」中尉（軍醫）ガ、渾名「バカン」  
虎。植木兵曹尉、「オレオレ」

一九四五年十一月十九日

英国空軍 元空軍中佐

「ピー・エス・アイブス」

(署名)

Doc. 5604.

北川軍曹 一九四四年三月ヨリ同年七月ヨリ第三收容所、收容  
所附軍曹。ソノ事がアリ得ルトスバ彼、前任者ヨリモモト  
悪カラシ。所ゾ難シ。病人及ビ将校ヲ特ニ嫌ミシ。彼、病人  
仕事ニ出ス事が好ミ、彼、好ミヲ刑罰ハ非常ニ重イ枝木長  
時間頭上ニ持タセル事デアリ。彼、規則ヲ破リテ侮辱ハ嚴シ  
罰スルヤラト。監視兵ヲタテ付ケル。……

「フジ」二等兵（最終所屬部隊「三山隊」非常ニ脊低イジ  
グリス。幅廣、顔ヲミテ日本兵。所屬トシテ、私、経験中  
テ最モ悪イ監視兵。彼、非道ナ行爲ヲスル事ヲ特ニ好ミ。收  
容所ニ入リテ来ル度毎ニ詰メテ殴ルト云フ記録ヲ持ツテ居リ。  
和蘭兵「モレ」ノ場合、如ク、左足ニ非常ニ大キナ腫物が出来  
テ苦シテ居リ。ソレガヤト治リカケタ時、「フジ」が止付イテ  
来テ。日本兵が来ルニ何故立タナト其、理由ヲ要求シ。  
「モレ」ハ足、腫物ヲ見セタガ勿シ「フジ」ニ其処ヲ蹴ラセシメタ。  
此、暴行ノ結果、三日程後、足、切斷サレ、三週間程後「モレ」  
ハ顔衰弱ト激痛ノ爲、死ニテシタ。此、暴行ノ目撃者ハ、  
和蘭軍醫部「ケンケ」中尉（軍醫）ガレ。渾名「バカン」  
虎。植木軍醫尉。「オホキ」と。

No. 9

一九四五年十一月十九日

英国空軍 元空軍中佐

「ピー・エス・アイグリス」

(四角丸)



Doc. 5604.

No. 9

北川軍曹 一九四四年三月ヨリ同年七月まで第三收容所、收容所附軍曹。ソノ事がアリ得ルトスバ彼、前任者ヨリモモト悪ク。ソノ難ク。病人及び特校ヲ特ニ嫌ミ。彼、病人ニ仕事ニ出ス事が好ミ。彼、好ミナ刑罰ハ非常ニ重イ。校木長時間頭上ニ持ツル事アリ。彼、規則ヲ破リ、付房ハ、嚴シク罰スルヤヲ。監視兵ヲタテケル。.....

「フジ」二等兵（最終所屬部隊「ミ」隊）非常ニ背低イ。ジグリング。幅廣。顔ヲミル日本兵。付房トテ、私、経験中ニ最も悪イ監視兵。彼、非道ナ行爲ヲスル事ヲ特ニ好ミ。收容所外ニ入リ、床ニ度毎ニ泣キテ、敵ト云フ記録ヲ持ツテ居リ。和蘭兵「モロ」ハ、場合、如ク、左足ニ非常ニ大キナ腫物が出来テ苦シテ居リ。ソレガヤト泣キケル時、「フジ」が止付イテ来テ。日本兵が来ニ何故立タテト其、理由ヲ要求シ。「モロ」ハ足、腫物ヲ見セタガハ「フジ」ニ其処ヲ蹴ラセシメ。此、暴行、結果、三日程後、足、切斷セ。三週間程後「モロ」ハ、刻限衰弱ト激衝、爲。死ニテシタ。此、暴行、目撃者ハ、和蘭軍醫部「ヤン」中尉（軍醫）アリ。渾名「バカン」虎。植本軍醫尉「オホシ」。

一九四五年十一月十九日

英國空軍 元空軍中佐

「ピー・イス・アイグイス」  
(署名)